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PIERCING SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN
BANKRUPTCY: MYTH OR REALITY?
I. INTRODUCTION
There are two United States Supreme Court cases, Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida1 and Alden v. Maine,2 which create an impenetrable
state sovereign immunity rule under the Eleventh Amendment. These
two cases, when combined, support the unconscionable proposition that
a citizen of a state cannot sue the state in federal or state court for a
violation of a federally created right under Article I of the United States
Constitution.
The result of such a rule recently presented itself in a case entitled
In re Chandler,3 which was brought before the Bankruptcy Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma. In Chandler, an Oklahoma citizen
sought to bring an adversary proceeding against the Oklahoma Tax
Commission ("OTC") to determine the dischargeability of his tax debt
owed to the state.4 In response to the suit, the OTC filed a motion to
dismiss and based its authority on sovereign immunity and Seminole
Tribe.5
The court denied the motion to dismiss the adversary proceeding
and the OTC appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel ("BAP") for the
Tenth Circuit.6 Consequently, the BAP court overruled and held that
state sovereign immunity barred the debtor from bringing such a suit
against the state of Oklahoma. z
Such a holding leaves the debtor with absolutely no remedy at law
for his dispute with the OTC, and it deprives him of his fundamental due
process rights guaranteed to him under the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution.8 Although this seems untenable, it is
absolutely correct under the Rehnquist Court and their interpretation of
1. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
2. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
3. No. 99-01929-M (Bankr. N.D. Okla. Mar. 8, 2000).
4. Id. at 2.
5. Id. at 3.
6. In re Chandler, 251 B.R. 872 (B.A.P 10th Cir. 2000).
7. Id. at 874-78.
8. See U.S. Const. amend. V (providing that "no person shall be.... deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law").
1
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the Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity.
It is clear that the Rehnquist Court is dedicated to protecting the
states' rights from being usurped from Congress. 9 However, in their zeal
to reclaim a more federalistic government, the Rehnquist Court has lost
sight of the practical consequences of their decisions in Seminole Tribe
and Alden. As Justice Holmes has stated, "[gireat cases like hard cases
make bad law. For great cases are called great, not by some reason of
their importance in shaping the law of the future, but because of some
accident of immediate overwhelming interest which appeals to the feeling
and distorts of judgment.""°
Justice Stevens warned of such one-sightedness in Seminole Tribe.
In his dissent he stated that the majority's holding "prevents Congress
from providing a federal forum for a broad range of actions against [the]
States, from those sounding in copyright and patent law, to those
concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation of our
vast national economy."" Thus, it seems as though the BAP Court's
holding in Chandler is a realization of such fears, and it is a perfect
example of the problems the Rehnquist Court has created by expounding
an impenetrable state sovereign immunity rule under the auspices of the
Eleventh Amendment and Federalism.12
This Comment is intended to show how state sovereign immunity
has developed under the Eleventh Amendment, where it stands today,
and the practical effects of the modem rule on cases involving
bankruptcy. Section II traces the development of the United States
Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence from the
amendment's ratification to the Rehnquist Court's decisions in Seminole
Tribe and Alden. Section III describes the application of the modern
understanding of the Eleventh Amendment within the context of
bankruptcy. Section III also details possible ways to circumvent the
Eleventh Amendment and enable debtors to bring suits against states.
Section TV concludes that the Rehnquist Court's modern understanding
of the Eleventh Amendment is fatally flawed and that the holding in
Jacoby v. Arkansas Department of Education3 is a compromise that
Congress, states, and citizens can live with in a comfortable manner.
9. See e.g. Printz v. U.S., 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that a provision under the Brady
Handgun Violence Protection Act was invalid because it forced states to administer a
federal regulatory scheme that violated the notion of "dual sovereignty"); U.S. v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995) (holding that the Gun Free School Act enacted under the Commerce
Clause was invalid because it violated the states' Tenth Amendment rights); N.Y. v. U.S.,
505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that a provision of the Low-level Radiation Waste Policy Act
was invalid because it commandeered the state to choose between administration of a
federal scheme or liability for any waste found in the state, which violated the Tenth
Amendment and "dual sovereignty").
10. N. Securities Co. v. U.S., 193 U.S. 197, 364 (1904).
11. Seminole 'Tribe, 517 U.S. at 77.
12. See infra Section IID.
13. 962 S.W.2d 773 (1998).
458 [Vol. 37:457
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As it stands, debtors like Chandler are without a legal remedy over
a dispute with a state and this is completely at odds with the "rule of
law" ideal, which is the foundation of the United States government.
14
Chief Justice Marshall was correct when he declared, "[tihe government
of the United States has been emphatically termed a government of laws,
and not of men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if
the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right."
15
Thus, when the United States Supreme Court creates constitutional law
protecting states' rights to the detriment of its people, that law is "bad
law," and it must give way to protect the integrity of the United States
and the legal foundation upon which it is built. Such a notion is far
from novel and can also be found in the writings of the Framers of the
United States Constitution: "as far as the sovereignty of the states
cannot be reconciled to the happiness of the people, the voice of every
good citizen must be .... let the former be sacrificed to the latter."
16
It is only a matter of time before the United States Supreme Court
will hear the issues discussed in this Comment.17 Therefore, it is hoped
that the Rehnquist Court will free itself from their agenda of re-
establishing federalism'8 and act as "good citizens" by allowing debtors
like Chandler to pursue valid suits against the states.
II. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
A. Origins of the Eleventh Amendment
In February of 1793, the United States Supreme Court decided
Chisholm v. Georgia. 19 Chisholm, a citizen from South Carolina, brought
an assumpsit action against the state of Georgia.20 The issue before the
Court was whether or not sovereign immunity protected Georgia from
such an action.2 ' Relying on Article III, section 2 of the United States
14. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803).
15. Id.
16. The Federalist No. 45, 309 (James Madison) (J.E. Cooke ed., Wesleyan U. Press
1961).
17. The Rehnquist Court has had several opportunities to decide the constitutionality of
the Issues presented in this Comment, but for one reason or another have decided against
such action. See e.g. In re Collins, 173 F.3d 924 (4th Cir. 1999), cert denied, 120 S. CL
785 (2000); In re NVR, L.P., 189 F.3d 442 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 936
(2000); In re Straight, 143 F.3d 1387 (10th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 446 (1998);
In re Creative Goldsmiths of D.C., Inc. 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S.
Ct. 1517 (1998).
18. Frledrich Nietzsche warned of individuals who believed too much in their cause when
he stated, "[wihoever fights monsters should see to it that in the process he does not
become a monster. And when you look long into an abyss, the abyss also looks into you."
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good & Evil 89 (Walter Kaufmann trans., Vintage Books 1989).
19. 2 U.S. 419 (1793).
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Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789, the majority determined that
Georgia's sovereign immunity had been abrogated and Chisholm's action
was valid.
Justice Iredell dissented from the Court's decision, stating that the
majority had essentially placed the "cart before the horse" because
Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution and the Judiciary
Act of 1789 did not by themselves abrogate states' sovereign immunity
granted to them under common law.23 Rather, the provisions only
provided for a jurisdictional scheme when Congress created legislative
acts that allow suits against the states by certain enumerated parties.2
Since Congress had not abrogated state sovereign immunity for actions
such as the one Chisholm was pursuing, Justice Iredell believed that the
action had no foundation on which to stand, and that the common law
understanding of state sovereign immunity was still in force.25
Nevertheless, the Chisholm decision sent panic throughout many of
the states.26 The Unites States House of Representatives proposed a
constitutional amendment to reverse the Court's holding only one day
after the decision was handed down.27 On February 7, 1795, two years
after it was proposed, the states ratified the Eleventh AmendmentY
which states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of
any Foreign State.
29
The passing of the Eleventh Amendment created scholarly debate as to
what purpose the amendment was to serve. 30 Many scholars agree that
it was specifically ratified to overrule Chisholm, but disagree as to what
22. Id. at 475-78. As it will be shown, the Rehnquist Court relies heavily on history to
determine the original intent of the Framers of the United States Constitution without
much regard for the text of the Constitution itself. See infra Section II.D. It is interesting,
however, that all of the Justices sitting to hear and decide Chisholm were active in the
actual framing of the Constitution. See Peter Irons, The People's History of the Supreme
Court 90-95 (Penguin 2000). For example, Justice James Wilson helped draft Article III
and should have been quite knowledgeable of its meaning. Id. Thus, it seems curious that
the Rehnquist Court so eagerly discounts the holding in Chisholm as a misunderstanding
of the original intent and structure of the Constitution. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 721.
23. Chisholm, 2 U.S. at 430-34.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 435.
26. H. Stephen Harris, Jr. & Michael P. Kenny, Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence After
Atascadero: The Coming Clash with Antitrust, Copyright, and Other Causes of Action which
the Federal Courts Have Exclusive Jurisdiction, 37 Emory L.J. 645, 653 (1988).
27. Id.
28. Id. at 654.
29. U.S. Const. amend. XI.
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view of the case the amendment spoke to.3 1  Did the Eleventh
Amendment reverse the majority's view that Article III, section 2 of the
United States Constitution and the Judiciary Act of 1789 abrogated state
sovereign immunity (as understood by Justice Iredell's dissent); or did
the Eleventh Amendment accept abrogation of state sovereign immunity
and merely deny original federal jurisdiction for suits against states by
citizens of other states and citizens of foreign states?
32
B. Early Understanding of the Eleventh Amendment
In 1890, the United States Supreme Court began to answer this
question on its own. In Hans v. Louisiana,33 a Louisiana citizen brought
suit against Louisiana to recover funds owed to him under state issued
bonds24 The Court had to determine whether or not the Eleventh
Amendment barred such a claim.3 5 The Court concluded that under a
plain reading of the amendment the answer would be no; however, the
Court believed that such a result would be anomalous because
cases arising under the constitution or laws of the United States, a state
may be sued in the federal courts by its own citizens, though is cannot be
sued for a like cause of action by the citizens of other states, or a foreign
state; and may thus be sued in federal courts, although not allowing itself
to be sued in its own courts.
36
Thus the Eleventh Amendment,
expressing the will of the ultimate sovereignty of the whole country,
superior to all legislatures and all courts, actually reversed the decision of
the supreme court [in Chisholn]. It did not in terms prohibit suits by
individuals against the states, but declared that the constitution should
not be construed to import any power to authorize the bringing of such
Suits.
3 7
Therefore, the Court believed that the Eleventh Amendment meant
something more than it actually said, and that in reality it
"constitutionalized" the common law notion of state sovereign immunity
as a defense to suits brought by private individuals against, states in
federal court.38  Under Hans, the Court expanded the Eleventh
31. Id. at 1696.
32. Id.
33. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
34. Id.
35. I& at 10.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 11.
38. The Court has relied on the reasoning of Hans for over a century. See e.g. N.C. v.
Temple, 134 U.S. 22, 30 (1890); Fitts v. McGhee, 172 U.S. 516, 524 (1899); Bell V. Miss.,
177 U.S. 693 (1900); Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 446 (1900); Palmer v. Ohio, 248 U.S.
32, 34, 39 (1918); Duhne v. N.J., 251 U.S. 311, 313 (1920); Mo. v. Fisk, 290 U.S. 18, 26
(1933); Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 51 (1944); Ford Motor Co. v. Dept.
of Treas. of nd., 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945); Ga. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S.
5
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Amendment to protect states against suits brought by Indian Tribes, 39
foreign nations, 40 and admiralty plaintiffs4' although the plain language
of the Eleventh Amendment does not address any of these particulars.
C. The Turn Away from the Reasoning of Hans
Justice Brennan was one of the first members of the United States
Supreme Court to show dissatisfaction with Hans and the vast
protection it afforded the states against suits created by federal law.42
He articulated his interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment in Parden
v. Terminal Railway of Alabama State Dockers Department,4 3 Employees
v. Department of Public Health and Welfare of Missour,44 and Atascadero
State Hospital v. Scanlor 45  Justice Brennan's understanding would
eventually command a majority in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas
Company.
46
In Parden, the Court was presented for the first time with a suit
brought by citizens of a state claiming the state violated a federally
created right under Article I of the United States Constitution.4 7 Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, held that Alabama was liable for
damages because Congress had abrogated the state's sovereign
immunity under the Federal Employees' Liability Act ("FELA"), which was
enacted under the Commerce Clause of Article 1.48 The majority
reasoned that acceptance of FELA necessarily waived a state's sovereign
immunity because regulation of interstate commerce is plenary.4 9
However, Parden stopped short of overruling Hans and its progeny. The
Court stated:
[Ojur conclusion that this suit may be maintained is in accord with the
common sense of this Nation's federalism. A State's immunity from suit
by an individual without its consent has been fully recognized by the
Eleventh Amendment and by subsequent decisions of this Court. But
when a State leaves the sphere that is exclusively its own and enters into
activities subject to congressional regulation, it subjects itself to that
299, 304 (1952); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427
U.S. 445 (1976); Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85, 102 (1982); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 97-100 (1984); Delluth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 227-229 (1989);
Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304 (1990); Puerto Rico Aqueduct &
Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 144 (1993).
39. E.g. Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatack, 505 U.S. 775, 779-82 (1991).
40. E.g. Monaco v. Miss., 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934).
41. E.g. ExparteN.Y., 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921).
42. Vasquez, supra n. 30, at 1698.
43. 377 U.S. 184 (1964).
44. 411 U.S. 279 (1973).
45. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
46. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
47. Parden, 377 U.S. at 187.
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regulation as fully as if it were a private person or corporation.
5 0
Justice Brennan reiterated this position in his dissent of Employees.1
However, he added that the Eleventh Amendment should be read
literally.5 2 To support this proposition, Justice Brennan cited Cohens v.
Virginia,53 which held that the Eleventh Amendment only withdrew
original federal jurisdiction for state law claims and not federal
questions.5 4
In his dissent of Atascadero, Justice Brennan fully developed his
views regarding Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, which he perceived
as "put[ting] the federal judiciary in the unseemly position of exempting
states from compliance with laws that bind every other legal actor in our
nation."55 Justice Brennan explained that the Eleventh Amendment was
an attempt to remedy a problem with the jurisdictional requirements of
Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution, which if left
unchanged would have permitted diversity jurisdiction in federal courts
over a state by non-citizens and foreigners.5 6 This, he believed, created a
federal bar against the defense of sovereign immunity in cases that only
involve state law. 7
Since Article III, section 2 of the United States Constitution only
had its diversity jurisdiction stripped away by the Eleventh Amendment,
its federal question jurisdiction remained intact, which
is as broad as... the lawmaking authority of Congress. If Congress
acting within its Article I or other powers creates a legal right and remedy,
and if neither the right nor the remedy violates any provision of the
Constitution outside Article III, then Congress may entrust adjudication of
claims based on the newly created right to the federal courts-even if the
defendant is a State.
58
From this brief exposition, it is clear that Justice Brennan was of the
opinion that state sovereign immunity was not "constitutionalized" by
the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, he believed that the Eleventh
Amendment only protected states from diversity suits in federal courts
by private parties.5 9
Four years after Atascadero, a majority of justices embraced Justice
Brennan's reasoning. In Union Gas, the state of Pennsylvania was sued
as a third party defendant to recoup a portion of the cost of an
50. Id. at 196.
51. Employees, 411 U.S. at 299.
52. Id. at309-11.
53. 19 U.S. 264 (1821) (Marshall, C.J.).
54. Id. at 348-49.
55. Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 248.
56. Id. at 289-91.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 290.
59. See ic.
7
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60environmental disaster. Pennsylvania argued that sovereign immunity
was a valid defense due to ambiguous language in the controlling act.6'
The majority found this position unavailing.62 They held that when the
states ratified the United States Constitution, the states had given their
consent in every instance that Congress chooses to abrogate the states'
sovereign immunity under the Constitution.63 Thus, after ninety-nine
years of interpreting the Eleventh Amendment as a
"constitutionalization" of absolute state sovereign immunity that began
with Hans, Justice Brennan had shifted to a pragmatic approach.
After this occurrence in Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, many
scholars scrambled to understand the United States Supreme Court's
position and what the Eleventh Amendment meant after Union Gas.
6A
Professor Vazquez, in his article on the subject, asks whether or not
"immunity conferred on the states by the Eleventh Amendment [is]
immunity from liability under federal law; or is it merely immunity from
the jurisdiction of the federal courts."6 5
D. The Rehnquist Court's Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment
The Rehnquist Court would begin to answer Professor Vazquez's
question in Seminole Tribe. As a preface to the decision, the Court
stated:
Although the text of the [Eleventh] Amendment would appear to restrict
only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, we have
understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much for what it
says, but for the presupposition... which it confirms. That
presupposition, first observed over a century ago in Hans v. Louisiana, has
two parts: first, that each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system;
and second, that it is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be
amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent.
66
In this case, the plaintiffs brought a suit against Florida for violating a
provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"), which required a
state to negotiate in "good faith" with Indians for the acquisition of
gaming rights.67 The Rehnquist Court determined that Congress did not
have the authority to abrogate states' sovereign immunity under the
United States Constitution even though the language of IGRA clearly
stated an intent to do so under the authority of the Indian Commence
60. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 6.
61. Id. at 11-14.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 19-21.
64. See e.g. Vazquez, supra n. 30, at 1699.
65. Id. at 1700.
66. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54-55 (citations and quotations omitted).
67. Id. at 47-53.
464 [Vol. 37:457
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Constitution.77 The Court concluded its opinion by stating:
We do not deem the fact that Seminole Tbe... has struck down state
liability for FLSA claims in federal courts as determinative of state liability
in its own courts. The FLSA remains valid law.... This law remains the
law throughout the land, and state sovereign immunity cannot impede it.
78
From this language it is clear that the Arkansas Supreme Court
understood Seminole Tribe as meaning state immunity from original
federal court jurisdiction and not immunity from rights and liabilities
created under federal law. Thus, states are still liable for violations of
federal law, but the state courts have original jurisdiction over such
claims, which they must hear under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution.79
In Alden, the plaintiff filed a suit in state court against the state of
Maine for an alleged violation of the FLSA.80 The Maine Supreme Court
held that the Eleventh Amendment stood for absolute sovereign state
immunity from suits initiated in state courts by private citizens. 81 The
Court based their claim on Seminole Tribe and its understanding of
Hans.8 2 Accordingly, the Court stated:
The Eleventh Amendment does not delimit the scope and effect of state
sovereign immunity. Rather, if reflects but one aspect of the states'
inherent, more sweeping immunity from suits brought by private parties.
A power so basic and profound would be an odd power indeed if it
protected the states from suit in federal courts but provided no
comparable protection in their own courts. If Congress does not have the
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity with respect to federal causes
of action brought in federal courts, as the Seminole Tribe case clearly held,
then that limitation on congressional power may not be circumvented
77. Id. at 775-76. The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Law of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof- and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, and any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary not withstanding.
U.S. Const. art. VI. The Arkansas Supreme Court cited Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356
(1990) to support its holding. Jacoby, 962 S.W.2d at 775. Howlett states:
Federal law is enforceable in state courts not because Congress has
determined that federal courts would otherwise be burdened or that
state courts might provide a more convenient forum-although both
might well be true-but because the Constitution and the laws passed
pursuant to it are as much laws in the states as laws passed by the state
legislature.
Howlett, 496 U.S. at 367. The decision went on to say that by not allowing these types of
suits in state courts, the states essentially could "nullify for their own people the legislative
decisions that Congress has made on behalf of all the people." Id. at 383.
78. Jacoby, 962 S.W.2d at 777.
79. Accord Vazquez, supra n. 30, at 1702.
80. Alden, 715 A.2d at 173.
81. Id. at 174.
82. Id. at 174-76.
466 [Vol. 37:457
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Clause.68 Through their holding, the Court expressly overruled Union
Gas and the rationale behind it. 69 The Court decreed:
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the background principle
of state sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not
so ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is an area, like
regulation of Indian commerce, that is under the exclusive control of the
Federal Government. Even when the Constitution vests in Congress
complete law-making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh
Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits by private
parties against unconsenting States. The Eleventh Amendment restricts
the judicial power of Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent
the constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction. Petitioner's
suit against the State of Florida must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. 70
However, an inconsistency emerges within the Court's understanding of
the Eleventh Amendment. In the beginning, the Court declared that "the
nature of sovereignty [is] not amenable to the suit of an individual,"
7 1
and then held that petitioner's suit "must be dismissed for lack of
[federal court] jurisdiction. " 72 Does this mean that states are still liable
to private individuals for a violation of a federal right in their own
courts? Seminole Tribe seems to have left the answer unclear. Two
different state supreme courts took up this question in Jacoby v.
Arkansas Department of Education3 and Alden v. State.7 4  After
evaluating the issue, the courts ultimately came to different conclusions.
In Jacoby, the plaintiff sued the state of Arkansas for a violation of
the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA7) in state court as an attempt to
avoid the rule established in Seminole Tribe.7 5 The Arkansas Supreme
Court noted that the Eleventh Amendment by its express terms only
applied to the judicial power of the United States, and held that the law
as expressed in FLSA bound Arkansas to suits in its own courts.76 The
Court qualified their holding by opining that when Congress creates
rights under a valid federal act, which clearly expresses an intention to
abrogate state sovereign immunity, the states loose the defense of
sovereign immunity due to the Supremacy Clause of the United States
68. Id. at 54-72. The rule created by Seminole Tribe has two prongs. First, Congress
must unequivocally express its intent to abrogate states' sovereign immunity; and second,
abrogation must be made pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Seminole
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 55, 59.
69. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 44.
72. Id. at 73.
73. 962 S.W.2d 773 (1998).
74. 715 A.2d 172 (1998).
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simply by moving to a state court.8 3
The plaintiff, having lost, appealed the Maine Supreme Court's decision
to the United States Supreme Court. In 1999, the Rehnquist Court
granted certiorari and set the stage for them to qualify their Seminole
Tribe holding and to either expand or contract the protection afforded to
the states under the Eleventh Amendment.M
The Court affirmed the decision of the Maine Supreme Court.85 In
doing so, the Court reached its decision by relying on historical events,
secondary accounts, and omnipresent notions of common law that were
fashionable during the time leading up to and immediately after the
ratification of the United States Constitution. 6  As Professor Young
explained, the Court "drop[ed] the textual fig leaf entirely, [and]
acknowledg[ed] that any principle of immunity applicable in state court
can have no basis in the Eleventh Amendment. " 8 The Court stated that
state sovereign immunity, as understood by the structure and substance
of the United States Constitution, protects the states from liability under
federal law made under the authority of Article I in suits brought in state
court.
8
The Court also refuted the Jacoby case's belief that the Supremacy
Clause was a barrier to such immunity.89 The Court reasoned that the
Supremacy Clause only applies to federal acts that accord with
constitutional design. 90 Since abrogation of states' sovereign immunity
necessarily infringes upon the Constitution, any federal law that does so
is unenforceable. 9 1 From the Rehnquist Court's logic, states' sovereign
immunity, as guaranteed in the structure and form of the United States
Constitution, supercedes the written portion of Article VI declaring
83. IL at 175.
84. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712 (1999).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 715, 741. In law school one is taught to follow a general hierarchy of legal
authorities to determine the outcome of a particular legal issue. That hierarchy in order
from the highest to lowest priority is the United States Constitution, United States
statutes, state constitutions, state statutes, and then the common law of the states if none
of the aforementioned authorities is controlling. History, it appears, is conspicuously
absent from the list. One wonders whether or not the Justices of the United States
Supreme Court feel at all constrained to follow this hierarchy that all other legal actors in
the United States are bound to follow? If an attorney argued a case relying exclusively on
history, he or she would undoubtedly be castigated by the opposing attorney as well as the
presiding judge. But when the Supreme Court does so-as in Alden-one must look for
ways to make this type of "structural" argument based on history valid. See generally
Young, infra n. 87. However, the Court should be held to the same standards as everyone
else.
87. Ernest A. Young, Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudence of Structure, 41 Win. & Mary
L. Rev. 1601, 1601 (2000).
88. SeeAlden, 527 U.S. at 728-29.
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federal law as "the Supreme law of the Land."9 2 Thus, after the Court's
decision in Alden, the Eleventh Amendment-or the spirit of the
amendment anyway-requires absolute state sovereign immunity from
liability under federal law.
III. BANKRUPTCY
A. The Eleventh Amendment in Bankruptcy Proceedings
The defense of state sovereign immunity generally raises three
issues that a bankruptcy court must address. 93 The first is whether a
litigated claim in bankruptcy constitutes a "suit."9 4 The second is
whether a state has somehow waived its right to assert sovereign
immunity.95  And third, whether 11 U.S.C. § 106 constitutionally
abrogates state sovereign immunity when no waiver is found.
96
However, before addressing these issues, a brief overview of
bankruptcy will be helpful. Bankruptcy is in the exclusive jurisdiction of
the United States government. 97 There were no longstanding laws on the
subject until 1898, when the "Torrey Bill" was passed and implemented
throughout the land.98 This bill, which is the foundation of the modem
Bankruptcy Code, has been amended many times.99
The guiding principle behind the modem Bankruptcy Code is the
notion of the debtor's right to a "fresh start."10 0 This fresh start is
intended to "free[ ] the debtor's future income from the chains of
previous debts,"10 ' and "give[ ] ... the honest but unfortunate debtor
who surrenders for distribution the property which he owns at the time
of bankruptcy, a new opportunity in life and a clear field for future
effort." 0 2 A person wishing to receive such a grant must file a petition in
the bankruptcy court.10 3 Immediately upon filing with the court, all of
the assets that the debtor owns become part of the "bankruptcy
estate,"104 and any actions by creditors to recover debt is prevented by
92. See id.
93. See e.g. In re Barrett Refining Corp., 221 B.R. 795 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1998).
94. Id. at 801-08.
95. Id. at 808-14.
96. Id. at 801-08.
97. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (stating, "Congress shall have the power... to...
establish... uniform laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States").
98. Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 Am.
Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 5, 24 (1995).
99. Id. at 26-43.
100. See generally Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98
Harv. L. Rev. 1393 (1985).
101. Id. at 1393.
102. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt; 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934).
103. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 541 (West 2001).
104. 11 U.S.C.A. § 541(a) (West 2001).
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the "automatic stay." ' °5
Individuals generally file a petition for either a Chapter 7 or Chapter
13 bankruptcy. In a Chapter 7 proceeding, a trustee is appointed to
liquidate the assets of the bankruptcy estate and to use the proceeds to
pay back debts according to a creditor hierarchy. 1 6 In contrast, the
trustee in a Chapter 13 proceeding reorganizes the debtor's assets and
debts so that monthly payments may be made over a period of time.1
0 7
In either proceeding, all interested parties must receive notice that a
bankruptcy has commenced and that their rights will be affected without
specific actions being taken. 0 8 To preserve their rights, creditors may
either file a "proof of claim" with the bankruptcy court' ° 9 or fie an
"adversary proceeding" to settle their dispute with the debtor. 110
However, an adversary proceeding is different from filing a proof of claim.
Adversary proceedings are usually brought to determine the
dischargeability of a debt."' Many times, the debts are of the type that
are nondischargeable but for narrow exceptions. 1 2  An adversary
proceeding is a separate action that relates to the bankruptcy, which is
essentially a two party dispute between a debtor and a creditor. 113 The
parties institute such a proceeding to determine the rights and duties of
each other, and in some instances seek monetary awards and
damages. 114
B. What Constitutes a "Suit" in Bankruptcy
In Cohens v. Virginia,1 5 Chief Justice Marshall gave the classic
definition of a "suit." He explained that a suit is a two party dispute,
where one party has been damaged or injured in some way, who is
seeking a remedy at law or equity, and that participation by either party
105. 11 U.S.C-.A § 362 (West 2001).
106. 11 U.S.C.A. § 701 et seq. (West 2001).
107. 11 U.S.C.A§ 1301 etseq. (West 2001).
108. Fed. R Bankr. P. 2002 (2001).
109. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3001 (2001); 11 U.S.C.A. § 501 (West 2001).
110. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7003 (2001); see 28 U.S.C.A. § 1334(b) (West 2001).
111. See e.g. Chandler, No. 99-01929-M.
112. See 11 U.S.CA. § 523 (West 2001). This section of the Bankruptcy Code provides a
list of debts that are nondischargeable and the exceptions that allow for a discharge.
Debtors and states clash most often regarding student loans and unpaid taxes. See e.g. In
re Innes, 184 F.3d 1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (denying state sovereign immunity on the theory
that state universities waived the defense by participating in federal loan programs); In re
Rose, 187 F.3d 926 (8th Cir. 1999) (holding that the state waived its sovereign immunity by
participating in federal student loan programs); In re Mitchell, 209 F.3d 1111 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that sovereign immunity barred a discharge of unpaid taxes); In re Jackson,
184 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that sovereign immunity was waived when the state
filed a proof of claim for unpaid taxes against the bankruptcy estate).
113. See 28 U.S.CA. § 1334(b) (West 2001); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7003 (2001).
114. See id.
115. 19 U.S. 264 (1821).
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is compulsory rather than permissive. 116
It seems clear that adversary proceedings, as described above, are
included in Chief Justice Marshall's definition in Cohens;17 however, the
Unites States Supreme Court has expressly ruled that proofs of claims
are not suits under such a definition.'18 The Court stated:
It is traditional bankruptcy law that he who invokes the aid of the
bankruptcy court by offering a proof of claim and demanding its allowance
must abide the consequences of that procedure. If the claimant is a State,
the procedure of proof and allowance is not transmitted into a suit against
the State because the court entertains objections to the claim. The State
is seeking something from the debtor. No judgment is sought against the
State. The whole process of proof, allowance, and the distribution is,
shortly speaking, an adjudication of interests claimed in a res.119
Thus a "bankruptcy case," containing multiple proofs of claims, is not a
suit because it is not a two party dispute, a creditor is not injured per se,
there is only the adjudication in a res or thing, and attendance on the
part of the creditor is permissive rather that compulsory. 12
0
The case of In re Collins'12 is a good example of a bankruptcy case
not constituting a suit. In Collins, the state failed to file a proof of claim
and the debtor was discharged of all debts.122 After six years, the state
tried to collect its debt and the debtor re-opened his bankruptcy case to
determine whether or not he still owed the money. 123 The Fourth Circuit
determined that sovereign immunity did not apply because re-opening
the case did not constitute a suit, and that the determination of such a
debt related back to the debtor's main case, in which the state, as a
creditor, was not required to appear. 24 The Fourth Circuit then held
that the debt owed to the state was extinguished because it did not meet
any of the exceptions to discharge. 1
25
As the Court noted, there are some debts (such as tax arrearages)
that survive through the debtor's discharge.126 This is the situation that
the debtor in Chandler has regarding the debt owed to the OTC.127 By
claiming sovereign immunity in the adversary proceeding, the debt
116. Id. at407-12.
117. See id.
118. See Gardner v. N.J., 329 U.S. 465 (1947).
119. Id. at 473. The Court relied in part on an earlier case, N.Y. v. Irving Trust Co., 288
U.S. 329 (1933), which stated "[i]f a state desires to participate in the assets of a bankrupt,
she must submit to appropriate requirements by the controlling power...." Id. at 333.
120. See id.
121. 173 F.3d 924 (4th Cir. 1999).
122. Id. at 927.
123. Id. at 926-27.
124. See id. at 929-931.
125. Id. at 931.
126. 11 U.S.C.A. § 523(a)(1) (West 2001).
127. Chandler, No. 99-01929-M.
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passes through the bankruptcy case without the court determining its
validity and leaves the debtor to account for the debt. 128
In short, a debtor is safe from the defense of sovereign immunity so
long as the state files a proof of claim or if the debts are of the type that
is usually discharged. Unfortunately for debtors, most debts incurred
against a state require an adversary proceeding. 1
29
C. What Constitutes a Waiver in Bankruptcy
If a debtor files an adversary proceeding to determine the
dischargeability of a debt owed to a state, he or she still stands the
chance that a state may waive the defense of sovereign immunity. There
are three ways for a state to do so.' 30 The first is wavier by a state
constitution or statute. ' 31 The second way is when a state constructively
consents to suits by its citizens.13 2 And the third way is by the state's
voluntary participation in any aspect of the bankruptcy case. 33
In order for a state to waive its defense of sovereign immunity by
statute or its constitution, the waiver must be free from any ambiguity
and must expressly allow the waiver to extend into the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. '34 Constructive consent to suits against a state by private
individuals involves state participation in optional federal programs that
condition participation upon the state's waiver of its sovereign
immunity. 3 5 As with the states, the language of the federal statute that




The third way states waive the defense of sovereign immunity is by
making a voluntary appearance in a suit. ' 7 Thus, states that voluntarily
file proofs of claims in a bankruptcy case waive any defense to sovereign
immunity.13 8 Many post-Seminole Tribe cases have also applied waiver
when states voluntarily participate in adversary proceedings.' 3 9  In
128. See id As the Court noted, the OTC is free under Oklahoma law to collect its debt by
levying the debtor's property and selling it without resort to the judicial process. Id. at 9.
129. See supran. 112.




134. Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944); Employees v. Mo. Pub. Health &
Welfare Dept., 411 U.S. 279, 283-285 (1973); Welch v. Tex. Dept. of Hwy. & Pub. Trans.,
483 U.S. 468, 478 (1987).
135. See Innes, 184 F.3d 1275; Rose, 187 F.3d 926.
136. Welch, 483 U.S. at 478.
137. E.g. Gardner, 329 U.S. at 573.
138. Id.
139. In re Martinez, 196 B.R. 225, 229-30 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1996); In re Charter Oaks
Associates, 203 B.R. 17, 21-22 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1996); In re York-Hanover Devel., Inc., 201
B.R. 137, 142 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1996); In re Sacred Heart Hosp., 199 B.R. 129, 134 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1996); In re Koehler, 204 B.R. 210, 217-20 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1997); In re Burke,
203 B.R. 493, 497-98 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996); In re Straight, 209 B.R. 546, 555-58 (Bankr.
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Chandler, the OTC did not waive its sovereign immunity under any of the
previously enumerated ways. 140  All that is left for the debtor is a
determination of whether or not the state's sovereign immunity is
constitutionally abrogated by 11 U.S.C. § 106.141
D. The Constitutionality of )) U.S.C. § 106 in Bankruptcy
Seminole Tribe establishes a two-prong test for determining whether
Congress has constitutionally abrogated states' sovereign immunity. The
first prong is whether the statute clearly expresses its intent to abrogate
states' sovereign immunity; and the second prong requires that the
statute be made pursuant to a valid exercise of Congressional power. 142
There is no doubt the language of 11 U.S.C. § 106 is clear and free
from any ambiguity regarding Congress' intent to abrogate states'
sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings against states.
43
However, there is much debate in the courts as to whether or not the
second prong of Seminole Tribe is satisfied. 144
According to Seminole Tribe, the only valid constitutional authority
allowing Congress to abrogate states' sovereign immunity is Section 5 of
D. Wyo. 1997).
140. See Chandler, No. 99-01929-M.
141. See id.
142. Id.
143. See 11 U.S.C. § 106 (West 2001). Section 106 reads in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity is
abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this section with
respect to the following:
(1) Sections 105, 106, 107, 108, 303, 346, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 502, 503,
505, 506, 510, 522, 523, 524, 525, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 546, 548, 549, 550,
551, 552, 553, 722, 724, 726, 728, 744, 749, 764, 901, 922, 926, 928, 929, 944,
1107, 1141, 1142, 1143, 1146, 1201, 1203, 1205, 1206, 1227, 1231, 1301, 1303,
1305, and 1327 of this title.
(2) The court may hear and determine any issue arising with respect to the
application of such sections to government units.
(3) The court may issue against a governmental unit an order, process, or
judgment under such sections or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure,
including an order or judgment awarding a money recovery, but not including an
award of punitive damages. Such order or judgment for costs or fees under this
title or the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure against any governmental unit
shall be consistent with the provisions and limitations of section 2412(d)(2)(A) of
title 28.
(4) The enforcement of any such order, process, or judgment against any
governmental unit shall be consistent with appropriate nonbankruptcy law
applicable to such governmental unit and, in the case of a money judgment
against the United States, shall be paid as if it is a judgment rendered by a
district court of the United States.
(5) Nothing in this section shall create any substantive claim for relief or cause of
action not otherwise existing under this title, the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, or nonbankruptcy law.
Id.
144. See infrann. 146-49.
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the Fourteenth Amendment. 145 Some courts have taken the position that
§ 106 was made pursuant to such authority, 146 but the vast majority of
courts have concluded that § 106 was not.' 47 Other courts have
concluded that § 106 was made pursuant to Article I, section 8, clause 4,
which is expressly forbidden by Seminole Tribe.l14
Regardless of the overwhelming majority contradicting the courts
that believe § 106 was made pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, the argument for such a position is still very persuasive. In
the case of In re Southern Star Foods, Inc.,149 decided prior to Seminole
Tribe, the court stated:
To attempt to separate the power of national enactment under Article I
from the power of national enforcement under the Fourteenth Amendment
is to mince the Constitution-to take what should be considered as a
working whole, and dismember it into a scatter of lifeless parts.... It is
apparent to this Court that 11 U.S.C. § 106(a), even though enacted
pursuant to Article I, is also a valid exercise of Congressional enforcement
power, including the power to abrogate State sovereign immunity, through
the Fourteenth Amendment.150
As will be show below, the Rehnquist Court has created case law that,
while not directly dealing with bankruptcy, severely limits and infringes
upon many of the aforementioned ways to pierce states' sovereign
immunity-including the notion that § 106 was made pursuant to
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
E. Restrictions on Piercing States' Sovereign Immunity in Bankruptcy
In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
145. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59. The Fourteenth Amendment reads in pertinent part:
Section 1. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any
person of life liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV.
146. In re Southern Star Foods, Inc., 190 B.R. 419, 426 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995); In re
Straight; 209 B.R. 540, 555 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1997); In re Headrick 203 B.R. 805, 809
(Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1996); In re Willis, 230 B.R 619, 623 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1999); In re Lees,
252 B.R. 441,449 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 2000).
147. In re Creative Goldsmiths of D.C., Inc., 119 F.3d 1140, 1146 (4th Cir. 1997); In re
Fernandez, 123 F.3d 241, 245-46 (5th Cir. 1997); In re Morrell, 218 B.R. 87, 91 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. 1997); In re Mueller, 211 B.R. 737, 742 (Bankr. D. Mont. 1997); In re Elias, 218
B.R. 80, 86 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998); In re Neary, 220 B.R. 864, 867 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1998);
In re Sacred Heart Hosp. of Norristown, 133 F.3d 237, 244 (3rd Cir. 1998).
148. In re Martinez, 196 B.R. 225, 230 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1996); In re York-Hanover Dev. Inc.,
201 B.R. 137, 142 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1996); In re Midland Mec[. Contractors, 200 B.R. 453,
457-58 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996); In Re NVR, L.P., 206 B.R 831, 838 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1997).
149. 190 B.R. 419 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1995).
150. Id. at 426 (quotations omitted).
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Expense Board, s5 the Rehnquist Court determined that constructive
waiver could not be used to abrogate states' sovereign immunity.1 2 if
applied in the bankruptcy context, cases that have held constructive
waiver valid when a state voluntarily participates in federal programs
that provide citizens with such things as student loans or money for
small businesses must be overruled. 
5 3
The Rehnquist Court has also limited the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment as a tool for abrogating states' sovereign immunity. In City
of Boerne v. Flores,'4 the Court restricted the Congress' use of Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that the provision was
"remedial" in nature and that it gives the "power to enforce, not the
power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation." 5 5 In a
subsequent case, FMorida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense
Board v. College Savings Bank,156 the Court reaffirmed and clarified its
hazy holding in Boerne. In order for legislation to be valid under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment -including legislation that abrogates
states' sovereign immunity -Congress "must identify conduct
transgressing the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive provisions" as
well as "tailor its legislative scheme to remedying or preventing such
conduct.'l
5 7
One commentator analyizing the application of the Boerne test to
the abrogation of states' sovereign immunity has outlined the two-step
process needed for a constitutional stamp of approval for abrogation of
states' sovereign immunity under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. First, Congress has to "find a pattern of constitutional
violations [of federal rights] by the States," attribute the pattern of
violations to a judicially accepted arm of the state, and incorporate the
151. 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
152. Id. at 680-8 1. The Court opined:
The whole point of requiring a "clear declaration" by the state of its waiver is to be
certain that the state in fact consents to a suit. But there is little reason to
assume actual consent based upon the State's mere presence in a field subject to
congressional regulation. There is a fundamental difference between a State's
expressing unequivocally that it waives its immunity, and Congress expressing
unequivocally its intention that if the State takes certain action it shall be deemed
to have waived that immunity.
Id. at 680-81. They relied in part on the prior case, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 655
(1974), which stated, "[c]onstructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with
the surrender of constitutional rights." College Savings Bank, 527 U.S. at 681.
153. See e.g. Rose, 187 F.3d 926 (holding that the state waived its sovereign immunity by
participating in federal student loan programs); In re Straight, 143 F.3d 1387 (10th Cir.
1998) (holding that the state waived its defense of sovereign immunity by participating in a
federal program to aid disadvantaged businesses).
154. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
155. Id. at 519.
156. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
157. Id. at 639.
158. William Thro, The Educational Lawyer's Guide to the Sovereign Immunity Revolution,
146 West L. Rev. 951, 961 (2000).
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findings of constitutional violations into "the legislative history of the
statute that purports to abrogate sovereign immunity."159 Second, the
federal courts have to determine whether abrogation of states' sovereign
immunity is necessary to remedy the constitutional violation of federal
rights, that abrogation is only limited to remedy the documented
violations of specific federal statutes, and preventing blanket abrogation
over states that have no record of the constitutional violations. 160
In the case of In re Creative Goldsmiths of Washington, D.C., Inc., 61
the Fourth Circuit used the Boerne test to invalidate the notion that §
106 was made pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
162
Creative Goldsmiths and the Boerne test will be a huge hurdle for debtors
to overcome. The Supreme Court has previously ruled that a discharge
in bankruptcy is only a privilege and not a constitutionally protected
right.16 Thus, a state, when denying consent to suits brought by the
debtor, is doing nothing that can be enforced by Congress under Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment."6
After the Rehnquist Court's rulings in College Savings Bank,
Boerne, and Florida Prepaid it seems as though debtors will have to rely
upon the states to either expressly waive their defense of sovereign
immunity under the Eleventh Amendment or voluntarily take part in the
bankruptcy proceeding or adversary proceeding in order to have a
chance to litigate their claims against the states. 6 5 However, there is a
Supreme Court doctrine that could possibly be used to circumvent the
debtor's game of chance with the state.
F. Ex Parte Young
Some scholars believe that with the current state of sovereign
immunity, and its devastating impact on bankruptcy, the doctrine of Ex
parte Young will be increasingly used as a way around the ironclad
protection now afforded to states under the Seminole Tribe's
interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment.166 The doctrine, as it was
159. Id. at 962-63.
160. Id. at 961.
161. 119 F.3d 1140 (4th Cir. 1997).
162. Id. at. 1146-47.
163. U.S. v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 446-47 (1973). Although the Supreme Court has not
explicitly overruled Kras, it could be argued that prior cases undermine the Court's logic in
the case. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970) (holding that a state statute
created a property right to be protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and that Ithe constitutional challenge cannot be answered by an argument
that public assistance benefits are a 'privilege and not a right'"); Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564, 571 (1972) (ThI[is] Court has finally and fully rejected the wooden distinction
between 'rights' and 'privileges' that once seemed to govern the applicability of procedural
due process rights.").
164. See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 519.
165. See infra Section III.C.
166. See Patricia C. Barsalou & Scott A. Stengel, Ex Parte Young: Relativity in Practice, 72
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originally fashioned by the United States Supreme Court, created an
exception to the Eleventh Amendment that allowed a private citizen to
sue a state official for injunctive relief from violating federally created
rights. 167  However, the doctrine has been severely curtailed over the
years.
In Edelman v. Jordan,16 the Court ruled that relief granted under
the Young doctrine was prospective only and that reparations for wrongly
withheld benefits would essentially be a retrospective claim against the
state. 16 9  This situation, the Court reasoned violated the Eleventh
Amendment. 1
70
In Seminole Tribe, the Court held that when Congress creates a
remedial scheme to combat particular violations of federal law by state
officers, the Young doctrine becomes inoperative. 11 Thus, the Court will
follow the remedies set forth in the plan rather than allowing a suit
against state officials. 
7 2
In Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderrnan, 1 3 the Court
determined that Young only applied to state officials for a violation of
federal law.'7 4 The Court opined, "it is difficult to think of a greater
intrusion on state sovereignty than when a federal court instructs state
officials on how to conform their conduct to state law."
75
The case of In re Schmitt 7 6 contemplates the application of the
Young doctrine within the bankruptcy setting. The court dismissed the
adversary proceeding based on state sovereign immunity and the binding
precedent of Seminole Tribe, but noted that bringing an adversary
proceeding against a state officer would require a different outcome.1
77
Am. Bankr. L.J. 455; M. Browning, Supreme Court Cases Have Major Bankruptcy
Implications, Consumer Bankr. News (July 29, 1999).
167. See Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
168. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
169. Id. at 664-65.
170. Id.
171. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74. The Court explained:
Where Congress has created a remedial scheme for the enforcement of a
particular federal right, we have, in suits against federal officers, refused to
supplement that scheme with one created by the judiciary. Here, of course, the
question is not whether a remedy should be created, but instead is whether the
Eleventh Amendment bar should be lifted, as it was in Ex Parte Young, in order to
allow a suit against a state officer. Nevertheless, we think that the same general
principle applies: Therefore, where Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial
scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right, a court
should hesitate before casting aside those limitations and permitting an action
against a state officer based upon Ex Parte Young.
Id. (citations omitted).
172. See id.
173. 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
174. Id. at 106.
175. Id.
176. 220 B.R. 68 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1998).
177. Id. at 71.
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The court opined that if the debtor were to do so, the Young doctrine and
its progeny would allow the debtor to get around the Eleventh
Amendment because "Itihe granting of a bankruptcy discharge enjoins a
creditor from enforcing the debt... [and] is a form of prospective
relief; 1 7 'the [Bankruptcy] Code does not establish a detailed remedial
scheme for obtaining the discharge of a student loan held by the
state; "17 9 and a discharge is a federal right.18 0
However, the Rehnquist Court potentially eviscerates the Young
doctrine's scope of application in their decision, Idaho v. Coeur d' Alene
Tribe of Idaho,""l which prevented Indians from using Young to sue
various state officials to determine the title to submerged lands on the
reservation. 8 2 The Court, conceding that the elements of the Young
doctrine were met, 18 3  denied its application because of special
sovereignty interests of the state.18
Although special sovereignty interests were not fully enumerated in
Coeur d' Alene, the Court's use of a balancing test to determine them will
undoubtedly figure prominently when the Young doctrine is asserted in
other contexts. One thing is certain, the Young doctrine will no longer
be applied to reach the states simply because a private citizen seeks
relief afforded under the doctrine.186 After Coeur d' Alene, debtors have
no guarantee that the Young doctrine will enable the bankruptcy court to
adjudicate his or her debt dispute with a state. 13
IV. CONCLUSION
The Rehnquist Court glossed over their devastating holding in Alden
by stating that there are real "limits... implicit in the constitutional
principle of sovereign immunity."' 88 The Court listed states' consent to
178. Id. at 73.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
182. Id. at 264-67.
183. Id. at 280.
184. Id. at 288.
185. Id. at 278, 280.
186. Coeurd'Alene, 521 U.S. at 270. The Court stated:
To interpret Young to permit a federal-court action to proceed in every case where
prospective declaratory and injunctive relief is sought against an officer, named in
his individual capacity, would be to adhere to an empty formalism and to
undermine the principle... that the Eleventh Amendment immunity represents a
real limitation on a federal court's federal-question jurisdiction.
Id.
187. See e.g. In re LTV Steel Co., Inc., 264 B.R. 455, 469 (2001) (holding that the Young
doctrine allowed a debtor to bring suit regarding tax debt because collecting taxes, while a
sovereign interest of the state, did not cross Coeur d' Alene's Eleventh Amendment
threshold).
188. Alden, 527 U.S. at 755.
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being sued, suits by the federal government to enforce compliance with
federal law, enforcement under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and the Young doctrine.18 9 Unfortunately for debtors like Chandler,
these limits are meaningless. 190
There is no doubt that the United States Constitution secures the
sovereignty of both the states and the federal government. However, the
Rehnquist Court's insisted upon symmetry and absolutism concerning
sovereign immunity of the states must give way to a more pragmatic
view. If it is respect that that the Rehnquist Court seeks to ordain upon
the states, the more reasonable model is that described in Jacoby v.
Arkansas Department of Education, 9' which forbids federal diversity
jurisdiction enumerated in the Eleventh Amendment, but requires the
state courts to uphold the "Supreme Law of the Land" when it has been
violated.
Having said that, the historical and structural holding of Alden is
wrong or misplaced at best. The judge's function when interpreting and
applying the Constitution is "to read English intelligently"192 and other
considerations should only come into play "when the meaning of the
words used is open to reasonable doubt." 9 3 The Eleventh Amendment is
free from ambiguity on its face, and the Rehnquist Court should not
indulge in speculation concerning its meaning or whether or not it is the
embodiment of great wisdom. 1
94
Furthermore, Seminole Tribe must have its exceptions. The
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, including its adjudication of
adversary proceedings, is sufficiently different from that of Article III
Courts to allow such an exception without rendering federalism moot.
As it stands, however, debtors like Chandler are without a remedy at law
189. Id. at 755-56.
190. See supra Section III.E-F.
191. 962 S.W.2d 773 (1998).
192. N. Securities, 193 U.S. at 401 (Holmes, J, dissenting).
193. Id.
194. As Justice Jackson remarked, "[wie are not final because we are infallible, but we are
infallible because we are final." Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 445, 540 (1953). Thus, Alden and
(to a lesser degree) Seminole Tribe are right only because the Court says they are right.
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for a valid claim against a state in either federal or state court, and
something must give way to make this anomaly disappear. 9 5 If not,
then "the rule of law" ideal is nothing more that an empty promise.
Chad J. Kutmas
195. There are, however, some bankruptcy courts that have eschewed the Court's
precedents and denied the states their protection of the Eleventh Amendment on less
traditional grounds. The first of these cases is In re Ranstron, 215 B.R. 454, 455 (Bankr.
N.D. Cal. 1997) (holding that Seminole Tribe did not apply in the context of a bankruptcy
proceeding and that "[only hoary case law extends the Eleventh Amendment to" cases
between a state and its citizens). The others include In re Bleimeister, 251 B.R. 383, 387-
88 (Bankr. D. Arlz. 2000), affd on other grounds, No. 00-1557-PHX (D. Ariz. 2001) (turning
the structural analysis of Alden on itself to declare that the states, by ratifying the United
States Constitution, lost their sovereign immunity in bankruptcy proceedings under Article
1, section 8, clause 4); In re Nelson, 254 B.R. 436, 443 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 2000); In re
Hood, 262 B.R. 412, 414 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2001).
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